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ARTICLE 
THE SPECIFICATION POWER 
ILAN WURMAN† 
When agencies implement their statutes, administrative law doctrine describes 
what they do as interpretation. This raises the question of how much deference courts 
ought to give to such agency interpretations of law. This Article claims, however, that 
something else is usually going on when agencies implement statutory schemes. Although 
agencies interpret law, as they must, as an incident to enforce the law, agencies also 
exercise another power altogether: an interstitial lawmaking, gap-filling, policymaking 
power, a power that I shall call the “specification power.” This Article aims to advance 
existing accounts of agency activity and judicial deference by demonstrating that 
agencies exercise distinct powers of law-interpretation and law-specification when 
implementing a statutory scheme. Most significantly, it provides a constitutional 
account for why agencies may exercise this specification power as a formalist matter, 
even if they cannot have final say over the interpretation of law. If this account is 
correct, then calls to overturn modern judicial deference may be overblown if agencies 
are usually exercising their powers not of interpretation, but of specification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The executive power to interpret law is at the center of modern debates 
over administrative law and the separation of powers. The doctrine 
announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council holds 
that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute that it administers.1 The doctrine is justified on at least 
two grounds: when Congress enacts statutes with ambiguities, Congress is 
presumed to delegate implicitly to the agencies the authority to resolve those 
ambiguities;2 and agencies are more politically accountable, technically 
expert, and institutionally competent than courts to do so.3 
 
1 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
2 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (stating that Chevron 
deference is “premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation 
from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps”); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 
638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of 
administrative authority.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 319 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Barrett, 494 U.S. at 649). 
3 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of 
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 
231 (1974)); see also, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) 
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Chevron’s “canonical”4 status in administrative law, however, may be 
fraying. Critics have noted the apparent inconsistency between Chevron 
deference and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which provides in 
§ 706 that a reviewing court “shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”5 Deference to executive 
interpretations also appears inconsistent with the structural separation of 
powers: Article III assigns the judicial power to “say what the law is”6 to 
judges with life tenure and salary protections so they may exercise their legal 
judgment while insulated from the political accountability that seems to 
justify Chevron deference.7 Finally, recent scholarship has suggested that 
historically courts may have respected only those executive interpretations 
that were contemporaneous with the enactment of the law or were 
longstanding, and were thus good evidence of what the law actually was.8 For 
these reasons, even former Justice Kennedy has joined calls from his more 
formalist colleagues to reconsider “the premises that underlie Chevron.”9 
Many scholars, however, maintain that deference is inevitable. Nicholas 
Bednar and Kristin Hickman recently argued, for example, that Chevron 
deference, or something much like it, “is a necessary consequence of and 
corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on agencies to exercise 
substantial policymaking discretion to resolve statutory details.”10 Unless 
Congress assumes “substantially more responsibility for making policy choices 
itself” or the courts “reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine,” they write, 
 
(“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.”); Bowen 
v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (noting that the deference in Chevron was “predicated 
on expertise”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 
YALE L.J. 2580, 2597-98 (2006) (“[T]he general argument for judicial deference to executive 
interpretations rests on the undeniable claims that specialized competence is often highly relevant and 
that political accountability plays a legitimate role in the choice of one or another approach.”). 
4 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296 (describing Chevron as “now-canonical”); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) (noting Chevron’s “foundational” and 
even “quasi-constitutional” status). 
5 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018); see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 871 (2001) (noting Chevron’s “conflict with the APA” and suggesting a way 
to resolve it). 
6 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
7 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465-66, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (setting forth the institutional and structural protections given to the judiciary). 
8 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 
916-19 (2017) (“Under the traditional interpretive approach, American courts ‘respected’ 
longstanding and contemporaneous executive interpretations of law . . . .”). 
9 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
10 Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1392, 1398 (2017). 
692 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 689 
“some variant of Chevron deference will be essential to guide and assist courts 
from intruding too deeply into a policy sphere for which they are ill-suited.”11 
A veritable legion of scholars has argued that deference is inevitable because 
the interpretation of broad statutory standards requires policymaking 
discretion, or the resolving of statutory “ambiguities” is for policymakers.12 And 
legal realists maintain that all interpretation inherently entails policymaking.13 
In short, when agencies implement statutory schemes, the doctrine treats 
their actions as “interpretations.”14 This then raises the question of how much 
courts ought to defer to such interpretations of law, a question that remains 
unresolved by courts and scholars. The claim here is that this debate has stalled 
 
11 Id. 
12 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 
611, 611, 617 (2009) (suggesting that ambiguity should simply be treated as calling for an exercise of 
policymaking); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has 
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 846, 848 (2010) 
(distinguishing between situations “in which there is statutory language against which to judge the 
agency’s action and one in which there is not,” but noting that the latter includes “the possibility 
that an agency might, in the future, adopt a different interpretation”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 464 (1989) 
(“When Congress has failed to speak clearly or comprehensively, who gets to decide what the law 
is? . . . When a regulatory statute is ambiguous . . . the agency stands as a potential alternative 
recipient of the power inevitably created by the legislature’s finite capacity for prescience and 
precision in expression.” (first emphasis added)); Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of 
Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 188 (2012) 
(“[T]he Court has begun to reclaim the interpretive power it ceded and the lawmaking power it 
shifted with the rise and fall of Chevron.” (emphasis added)); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the 
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (“A statement that judicial deference is mandated 
to an administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial 
conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency.”); id. 
at 7 (“[O]nce the delegation of law-making competence to administrative agencies is recognized as 
permissible, judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is simply one way of recognizing such 
a delegation.” (emphases added)); id. at 28 (“Indeed, it would be violating legislative supremacy by 
failing to defer to the interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-
making authority.” (emphases added)); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron 
Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 963 (2018) (“A court that holds that an ambiguous statute 
constitutes a delegation of power to the agency is interpreting the statute . . . .”); Peter L. Strauss, 
“Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1143, 1144-45, 1159-60 (2012) (arguing that agencies have policymaking discretion in “Chevron 
spaces,” which are “created by statutory imprecision” and when “statutory meaning is uncertain”). 
The Supreme Court has also been unable to disentangle these notions since it decided Chevron. See, 
e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“Yet it can still be apparent from the 
agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would 
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute 
or fills a space in the enacted law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
13 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2587, 2591-93 (noting the close relationship between interpretation 
and policymaking). 
14 As the Court has said, “the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of 
reason) of such statutes.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
983 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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because, although the doctrine treats agency implementations of statutes as 
interpretation, something else is in fact usually going on. Agencies do interpret 
law as an incident to enforcing the law, but they also do something else: they 
exercise a kind of interstitial lawmaking, gap-filling, policymaking power where 
the statute is clear but does not specify a course of action, a power that I shall 
call the “specification power.” 
Although many deference proponents have intuited that agencies are doing 
something along these lines, they have been unable to escape the doctrinal 
vocabulary of interpretation and therefore have failed to provide an accurate 
descriptive or constitutional account of this power.15 A few scholars have 
recognized that the doctrine seems to conflate two different powers or 
activities,16 but none provides a complete constitutional account of why 
agencies may exercise this policymaking power, nor provides a satisfactory 
account of what distinguishes the “interpretation” that agencies do from their 
“policymaking.”17 This Article supplements the work of these scholars, 
illustrating the distinction between interpretation and “specification” and 
providing arguments from the Constitution’s text, structure, and history for 
why agencies may exercise this specification power. 
American legal history is replete with examples of the exercise of both 
kinds of power. In the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding, the Court was 
confronted with two statutes, one which granted a pension to all widows of 
naval service members, and another which granted a pension specifically to 
the widow of Commodore Stephen Decatur.18 Mrs. Decatur sought to collect 
both pensions.19 The Court recognized that the interpretation of this law 
could leave room for discretion and even disagreement, and thus the Court 
would not compel the executive to adopt one interpretation over another 
 
15 See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 10, at 1446-53 (referring to agency interpretation of 
statutes as both “interpretation” and “gap”-filling); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2591-93 (explaining the 
legal realist insight that the exercise of “interpretation” inherently involves policymaking decisions); 
see also generally supra note 12. 
16 See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 691 (2007) (“The 
Court’s labeling of administrative work as statutory construction has obscured the distinct carrying-out 
role of public bureaucracies.”); Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1867, 1891 (2015) (noting that “two meanings” of Chevron are “often confounded”); Lawrence B. 
Solum & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction 3 (Dec. 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300626 [https://perma.cc/TZX7-U7TE] (asking 
whether “there are actually two quite distinct Chevron doctrines?”); see also infra Part I.D. 
17 See infra Part I.D. 
18 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 498 (1840). 
19 Id. 
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through a writ of mandamus.20 But the Court also noted that had a 
nonmandamus action been brought, then “the Court certainly would not be 
bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a department” because 
in such cases it is the Court’s “duty to interpret the act of Congress, in order 
to ascertain the rights of the parties in the cause before them.”21 
On the other hand, one of the earliest federal statutes provided that the 
military pensions that had been granted and paid by the states pursuant to 
the acts of the Confederation Congress to the wounded and disabled veterans 
of the Revolutionary War “shall be continued and paid by the United States, 
from the fourth day of March last, for the space of one year, under such 
regulations as the President of the United States may direct.”22 President 
Washington’s regulations stated that the sums owed were to be paid in “two 
equal payments,” the first on March 5, 1790, and the second on June 5, 1790, 
and that each application for payment was to be accompanied by certain 
vouchers as evidence that the invalid served in a particular regiment or vessel 
at the time he was disabled.23 
This is a particularly clear example of an executive officer exercising a 
power not of interpretation, but of what we might call specification. The 
regulation concerning two equal payments to be made three months apart was 
certainly a reasonable interpretation of the statute, which required the 
payments to be made within one year. Yet the executive could have chosen 
any number of other options: daily installments for the entire year, three 
installments at varying intervals to be completed within the year, and so on. 
Each of these options, in and of itself, would have been a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute because the statute only required such payments 
to be made within a year. 
The act of choosing among these various possible interpretations, however, 
was not an act of interpretation. Nothing in the statute demanded one regulation 
over another; all would have been reasonable interpretations because all would 
have been permitted by the statute. The choice among these options, then, was 
not an act of interpretation, and that choice requires a different vocabulary. I 
 
20 Id. at 515 (“The head of an executive department of the government, in the administration 
of the various and important concerns of his office, . . . must exercise his judgment in expounding 
the laws and resolutions of Congress, under which he is from time to time required to act.”). 
21 Id. This element of the case is discussed in Bamzai, supra note 8, at 951-52. As explained, 
although the courts did defer to executive interpretations of law, they did so only according to two 
canons of statutory construction that afforded weight to such interpretations if they were 
contemporaneous with the enactment of the law itself, or were longstanding, in which case they 
would be good evidence of what the law actually was. Id. at 916-18, 933, 937. 
22 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95, 95. 
23 These regulations are preserved in the Library of Congress, and can be viewed at An Act Providing 
for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States (Oct. 13, 1789), reprinted in LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.21201200/?sp=1 [https://perma.cc/R29C-C9SU]. 
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suggest the term “specification”: the executive officers specified this detail of 
implementation—this course of action—within the bounds of what the statute 
permitted but without more specific direction from the statute itself. Nothing 
in the statute bore on their choice, so long as it was within the range of options 
created by the best interpretation of the statute’s limits. 
Now consider another case: A statute provides that a “stationary source” is 
defined as “any building, structure, facility, or installation” which emits air 
pollution. The statute does not say, however, what to do when more than one 
of these definitions applies, for example when there is a facility that includes 
multiple structures and installations. A judge might do all the “interpretation” 
there is to do—ascertaining the meaning of all the relevant terms as well as the 
legal effect of those terms against the structure and backdrop of the entire 
statute and preexisting law more broadly—and the statute might simply not 
answer the question. The statute is not ambiguous, nor is it vague. It has simply 
left a “gap” or a “silence,” a space within which the executive might specify the 
course of action in order to implement the statutory scheme. Here, again, the 
result of the executive’s choice would, of course, be a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute; but the act of choosing among the multiple permissible options 
would not be an act of interpretation. These were the facts of Chevron itself,24 
facts that call for an exercise of the specification power. This is the power to fill 
in the details where the statute is clear but does not specify the course of action. 
Although agencies may not have final say over the interpretation of law, 
their exercise of the specification power is rooted in the text, structure, and 
history of both the “legislative power” and the “executive power.” Chief 
Justice John Marshall recognized long ago that there was a category of power 
partly but not wholly legislative in its nature—we shall call it here 
“nonexclusive” legislative power—that Congress may exercise itself or 
delegate to the other branches.25 He described this power as the power to “fill 
up the details” of a general statutory provision.26 The specification power may 
also be deduced from the vesting of “the executive power” in the chief 
executive, whether one adopts the prevailing formalist account that the 
vesting clause is a residual grant of power or the view that it merely grants a 
power of law-execution.27 
 
24 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 859-62 (1984). 
25 The term “nonexclusive legislative power” is the author’s. It is inspired by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, in which he distinguished between “exclusively legislative” power 
that Congress cannot delegate—that is, a power that in its nature was strictly and solely legislative, 
and which therefore had to be exercised by Congress—and power that “Congress may certainly 
delegate to others,” but which it also “may rightfully exercise itself.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 
(10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825). 
26 Id. at 43. 
27 See infra Section III.B. At this juncture, it is worth distinguishing the account put forward 
here from three other accounts. First, Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have argued that the 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly canvasses the literature on 
judicial deference to show that the doctrine and the literature describe agency 
action in this sphere as “interpretation.” It then shows that the debate over 
whether to defer to such interpretations has stalled because the principal 
antagonists in the debate seem to presume the agency power at issue is 
different, although they all refer to it using the same vocabulary of 
interpretation. Part II seeks to demonstrate that agencies have historically 
exercised not only a power of law-interpretation, but also a power of law-
specification, when implementing a statutory scheme. Part III provides a 
constitutional account for why agencies may exercise this specification power, 
even if they cannot have final say over the interpretation of law. Part IV teases 
out the implications, revisiting the Chevron decision and making a formalist 
case for a kind of deference, at least to an agency’s specification power. This 
Part also demonstrates how this distinction may clarify other administrative 
law puzzles, such as the distinction between interpretative and legislative rules 
for purposes of the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures. 
I. THE STANDARD DEBATE 
The Chevron decision is one of the most cited in all administrative law.28 
The brief sections that follow seek only to elucidate the nature of the existing 
debate, and how it has stalled. 
 
President has a power to “complete” laws. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s 
Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006). They do not recognize this power, however, as distinct 
from the power of law-interpretation. Id. at 2290 (arguing that the completion power includes 
“authority to resolve statutory ambiguities or fill up statutory interstices”). The term “completion” 
power is also not the best term because the executive never quite completes a statutory scheme, but 
rather specifies particular details when necessary for implementation. 
Second, Peter Strauss has described a “Chevron space,” a space of policymaking discretion that 
exists in between the spaces where statutory meaning is clear and compels a particular action on the 
one hand, and is clear and prohibits an action on the other. Strauss, supra note 12, at 1145. That 
approach is similar to the one presented here, but there is an important difference: under a 
specification power analysis even where the statute is not “clear” (i.e., it neither clearly requires, nor 
clearly prohibits the action), it is still up to the courts to decide whether the best interpretation of 
the statute permits the particular option. 
Finally, another way to think about the specification power is that it is exercised in those classes 
of cases to which Justice Kavanaugh would simply apply arbitrary and capricious review after a court 
has done all the interpretation there is to do at “Step One” of Chevron. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, 
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153-54 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (explaining that in cases where statutes use “broad and 
open-ended terms,” courts should defer to agency interpretation in the same way they do when 
conducting an arbitrary and capricious review). Although Kavanaugh’s account works within the 
existing doctrinal vocabulary, its central idea is consistent with the argument presented here. 
28 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 16, at 1870 n.19 (“It seems an obligation of the form to point out 
that Chevron is the most cited decision in administrative law.”); Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. 
Walker, Foreword, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 
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A. Chevron and Its Rationales 
Chevron announced the rule that, when reviewing an agency’s 
implementing regulations, a court must first ask “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”29 If the statute clearly 
answers the question, “that is the end of the matter”; but “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”30 That means the court must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute even if it is not the “best” reading—that is, the 
reading at which the court itself would have arrived if it were asked to 
interpret the statute in the first instance.31 
The Court and literature have suggested several rationales for the rule. 
Early on, the cases and literature theorized that statutory ambiguities are 
implicit delegations of authority from Congress to the agencies to resolve 
those ambiguities.32 The Court in Chevron also relied upon agency 
accountability and expertise, and later commentators have emphasized these 
rationales.33 The Court relied on precedent, stating that it has “long 
 
& n.2, 495 (2014) (concluding that “Chevron is the most cited administrative law decision of all time” 
with, as of that time, over 68,000 citations across judicial decisions, court filings, and law review 
articles while Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), another competitor for most cited 
case, had only 48,608 total citations). 
29 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
30 Id. at 842-43. 
31 Id. at 843 n.11; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 983 (2005) (“Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous 
statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative . . . . Instead, the agency 
may . . . choose a different construction, since the agency remains the authoritative 
interpreter . . . of such statutes.”). 
32 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (describing 
deference as “premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation 
from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps”); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 
638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of 
administrative authority.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 319 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting the same); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (arguing that Chevron announced “an across-
the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant”). But see Michael 
Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 187, 195-96 (1992) (arguing that the political and constitutional “rivalry” between the 
legislative and executive branches undercuts the theory that “Congress actually wants to hand over 
power to the agencies” and arguing that statutory ambiguities are mainly the result of legislative 
constraints, not a “conscious desire of Congress to leave policy-making to the agency”). 
33 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either 
political branch of the Government.”); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 
633, 651-52 (1990) (“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron 
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recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer.”34 In a subsequent case, Justice Scalia sought to root the doctrine 
in the history of mandamus review.35 As the next two subsections show, the 
two principal sides to the debate can never come to a fundamental agreement 
about these rationales because both work within the same doctrinal 
vocabulary of “interpretation,” but each in fact maintains a very different 
understanding of the agency power at issue. 
B. The Case Against Deference: Article III 
Ever since Chevron was decided, there have been scholars who have argued 
that deference to agency statutory interpretation violates Article III, which vests 
the judicial power “to say what the law is”36 in life-tenured, salary-protected 
judges.37 The most systematic critic has been Philip Hamburger, who challenges 
deference in a long book on administrative law38 and in a more recent article.39 
In the latter, Hamburger argues that “judges under Article III have the 
constitutional office or duty to exercise their own independent judgment about 
what the law is for their purposes,”40 a duty which justifies not only the power 
of judges to decide cases but also “their security in their tenure and salaries.”41 
Indeed, one of the core rationales for Chevron deference has been the 
relative political accountability of administrative agencies.42 Yet judges were 
accorded life tenure and salary protections to avoid this kind of political 
accountability when making legal judgments. In The Federalist, Hamilton 
argued that if courts were to be “bulwarks of a limited Constitution,” there 
 
deference.”); Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (noting that the deference 
accorded in Chevron was “predicated on expertise”); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2597-98 (“[T]he 
general argument for judicial deference to executive interpretations rests on the undeniable claims 
that specialized competence is often highly relevant and that political accountability plays a 
legitimate role in the choice of one or another approach.”). 
34 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 & n.14 (citing cases supporting this view). 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-42 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in courts whose judges “shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). For some early 
literature on the apparent inconsistency of Chevron and Article III, see, for example, Farina, supra 
note 12, at 467, 528. 
38 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 309-21 (2014) (describing 
and criticizing various forms of judicial deference). 
39 Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016). 
40 Id. at 1195. 
41 Id. at 1209. 
42 See Sunstein, supra note 3. 
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ought to be “permanent tenure of judicial offices,” which would contribute to 
an “independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful 
performance of so arduous a duty.”43 
These concerns have been echoed by a number of Justices of the Supreme 
Court, particularly Justice Antonin Scalia, who perhaps more than any other 
judge is responsible for the prominence of modern-day deference.44 
Notwithstanding his support for deference, Scalia noted the apparent 
inconsistency between deference to agency legal interpretations and the 
requirements of Article III.45 
Most recently, Justice Thomas wrote in Michigan v. EPA that “[t]he judicial 
power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent 
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws,” and that 
“[i]nterpreting federal statutes—including ambiguous ones administered by an 
agency—‘calls for that exercise of independent judgment.’”46 Thomas argues that 
transferring interpretive authority to agencies “is in tension with Article III’s 
Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, 
not administrative agencies.”47 And if what’s going on is not interpretation but 
rather a kind of legislative power (as I shall argue below), Justice Thomas has said 
that giving this legislative power to agencies would also violate the Constitution, 
which requires Congress to exercise such power with limited historical exceptions 
for courts.48 Justice Thomas has been recently joined on the Court by Justice 
Gorsuch, who shares his views on deference.49 
 
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
44 For Justice Scalia’s influence, see Scalia, supra note 32, at 512 (arguing the deference should 
be accorded even to a “pure question of statutory construction”); id. at 514 (explaining that the cases 
justify deference to administrative legal interpretations on the basis of the “‘expertise’ of the agencies 
in question,” their “intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue,” and 
“their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate those purposes”); id. at 516 (rooting Chevron’s 
theoretical justification in a theory of congressional intent to delegate to agencies interpretive 
authority to resolve ambiguities). 
45 Id. at 513 (“Indeed, on its face the suggestion [to defer to an executive agency on a question 
of law] seems quite incompatible with Marshall’s aphorism that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
46 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217, 1219 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
47 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
48 Id. at 2713. 
49 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”). Justice 
Kavanaugh may also share these views. He would cabin deference to cases of “broad and open-ended 
terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’” Kavanaugh, supra note 29, at 2153; see 
also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448-49 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[S]ome cases involve regulations that employ broad and open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ 
‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’ Those kinds of terms afford agencies broad policy discretion, 
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What, then, explained the Court’s departure from these constitutional 
requirements in Chevron? The Court, as explained, appears to have relied on 
precedents dating back to the early Republic in which courts deferred to 
executive interpretations of law. According to recent scholarship, however, 
this reliance was likely misplaced. The federal courts appear not to have 
deferred to executive interpretations as such; rather, they seem to have 
deferred to them in accordance with two canons of statutory construction that 
treated contemporaneous executive interpretations and longstanding 
executive interpretations as good evidence of what the law actually is.50 In 
other words, if agencies are interpreting law, then the constitutional case for 
deference is relatively weak. 
C. The Case for Deference: Interstitial Lawmaking 
The defenses of deference to agency interpretations of law, for the most 
part, are not rooted in constitutional arguments, but rather in a “realistic” 
view of law itself. According to this view, neither administrators nor judges 
really “interpret” law, but rather “make” law. Many scholars have argued that 
“interpreting” broad statutory provisions entails significant policymaking 
discretion, and policymaking is for the political branches. 
In 1991, Ann Woolhandler suggested that “the most coherent justification 
for judicial deference to agency lawmaking (sometimes called ‘policymaking’ 
or the ‘exercise of discretion’) is that agencies exercise delegated legislative 
power.”51 If this justification were unlawful because of the principle that 
Congress cannot delegate its legislative power, then that raises the question 
“how it was that the courts themselves” had historically exercised similar 
policymaking functions.52 Woolhandler explains that “[s]ome lawmaking 
functions must inevitably flow to the branches that apply legislation to 
particular facts, that is, the executive or the judiciary.”53 Although “such 
executive action is verbalized as law-execution or administration, and such 
judicial action is verbalized as law-judging, interpretation, or discovering, 
they all nevertheless involve lawmaking functions.”54 Once it is recognized 
that both “administration” of the law and the judicial “interpretation” of the 
 
and courts allow an agency to reasonably exercise its discretion to choose among the options allowed 
by the text of the rule.”). 
50 Bamzai, supra note 8, at 930-47 (showing that these early cases relied on the contemporanea 
expositio and interpres consuetudo canons of constructions, and did not defer to executive 
interpretations of law qua executive interpretations of law). 
51 Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 
ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 213 (1991). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 205. 
54 Id. 
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law involve the same kind of function, and that this function is one of 
lawmaking or policymaking that the courts are not uniquely qualified to 
discharge, the case for deference is stronger than if one adopts a rigidly 
formalist account of the separation of powers.55 
Fifteen years later, Cass Sunstein argued that the Court’s rationales in 
Chevron amounted to “a candid recognition that assessments of policy are 
sometimes indispensable to statutory interpretation.”56 Sunstein sees deference 
as an outgrowth of “the legal realist attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning” 
and the shift from common-law regulation to administrative regulation.57 
Sunstein cites to the legal realists Max Radin and Ernst Freund, who argued 
that “the inevitable ambiguities of language” make the interpretation of law “a 
controlling factor in the effect of legislative instruments,” and thus make courts 
a “rival organ with the legislature in the development of the written law.”58 
Supposing that the legal realists “were broadly right” to suggest that 
policymaking inheres in interpreting statutory ambiguity, “then there seems to 
be little reason to think that courts, rather than the executive, should be making 
the key judgments.”59 In sum, the recognition of executive “law-interpreting 
power can be understood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift 
from judicial to executive branch lawmaking.”60 
In light of the growing calls to cabin Chevron, Nicholas Bednar and Kristin 
Hickman recently invoked similar arguments. Because “statutory ambiguity is 
unavoidable,” or put differently, because “statutory questions simply do not 
have answers that can be derived through traditional common law reasoning,” 
 
55 Woolhandler was not the first to make arguments along these lines. See also, e.g., Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 
41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307 (1988) (arguing that “through the process of statutory interpretation” in 
many cases, “courts are resolving a policy issue that Congress raised but declined to resolve” and 
thus a judge’s “personal political philosophy influences greatly his resolution of the policy issue” 
(footnote omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in 
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 507-08 (1985) (“Comparative institutional analysis 
demonstrates that, when Congress enacts a statute that raises but does not resolve an important 
policy issue, the executive branch is the preferred institution to resolve that issue.”). 
Henry P. Monaghan made similar arguments in his famous article on judicial deference, 
published one year before Chevron. See Monaghan, supra note 12. He explained that “once the 
delegation of law-making competence to administrative agencies is recognized as permissible, 
judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is simply one way of recognizing such a 
delegation.” Id. at 7. Monaghan explained that “[t]he current fashion is to decry the sweeping 
delegations of law-making authority conferred upon administrative agencies,” but “[o]nce the 
propriety of agency law making is recognized, the analytic problem is considerably simplified. 
Judicial deference to agency ‘interpretation’ of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making 
authority to an agency.” Id. at 25-26. 
56 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2587. 
57 Id. at 2591. 
58 Id. (quoting Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 208 (1917)). 
59 Id. at 2592. 
60 Id. at 2595. 
702 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 689 
resolution of these questions depends on policy considerations.61 For example, 
Bednar and Hickman argue that the Communications Act of 1934 gave the 
Federal Communications Commission “specific authority to establish uniform 
standards of accounting for utilities,” but nothing in the statute “offered more 
detailed guidance regarding the content” of those standards.62 What was the 
Court to do, other than defer and review for a minimum quantum of 
rationality?63 “[P]articularly given the complexity of modern statutes,” 
Congress often intends “that agencies have discretion in filling the gap.”64 
Further, eliminating Chevron “will not magically resolve the problem of 
statutory ambiguity,” over which judges themselves will disagree; this 
disagreement again prompts the question whether judges or administrators 
should resolve these ambiguities.65 Several other scholars have similarly argued 
that interpretive ambiguity often calls for policymaking discretion.66 
Formalists tend to reject this line of argument. Cynthia Farina has 
observed, for example, that “this nonchalant classification of law interpretation 
as simply a species of lawmaking is troubling,” and that “[i]ts logical 
implication—that what courts, the archetypal interpreters, do when they 
construe a law is really no different than what legislatures, the archetypal 
lawmakers, do when they create a law—looks wondrous strange against the 
backdrop of our 200-year legal tradition.”67 To be sure, at least one formalist, 
Philip Hamburger, has recognized that judges do in fact engage in a kind of 
lawmaking when exercising the judicial power. “It is widely recognized that 
judges often use their interpretation as a mode of lawmaking,” but it would be 
a “gross overstatement . . . to conclude” that this interpretation “is merely 
lawmaking.”68 In the end, Hamburger argues, it “also is interpretation,”69—that 
is, the judicial power simultaneously partakes of interpretive and lawmaking 
qualities. Thus, judges should exercise independent judgment regardless.70 
Sunstein shares a similar position, but reaches a different conclusion. Adopting 
the view of the legal realists that lawmaking inheres in all acts of interpretation, 
Sunstein would have judges share this interpretive power with agencies.71 
 
61 Bednar & Hickman, supra note 10, at 1446-47. 
62 Id. at 1447-48. 
63 Id. at 1448. 
64 Id. at 1449; see also id. at 1458 (“[M]any statutes contemplate that agencies will exercise 
discretion to fill statutory gaps . . . .”). 
65 Id. at 1453. 
66 See supra note 12. 
67 Farina, supra note 12, at 477. 
68 Hamburger, supra note 39, at 1223. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2582-84. 
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D. Policymaking and the Interpretation-Construction Distinction 
Some scholars have recognized that there are, in fact, two distinct powers 
at play that the Court’s deference framework seems to conflate. Elizabeth Foote 
has argued that Chevron’s “paradigm” that “mainstream public administration is 
the same activity as statutory construction”72 is incorrect as a matter of 
administrative theory, which posits that agencies are doing much more than 
merely interpreting law when “carrying out” administrative statutes. She argues 
that the “administrative function is an operational, policy-implementing role” 
that is “quite foreign to the work product of a court.”73 “[A]gencies implement 
their enabling acts with a combination of expertise, practicality, interest-group 
input, and political will,” and not the “judicial-style methodology that would 
be principally attentive to the text and structure” of statutes.74 The inputs that 
go into agency decisions go beyond statutory interpretation and include 
technical assessments, expert predictions, policy views, public input, political 
influence, and practical needs.75 This distinction between statutory 
interpretation or construction on the one hand and the administrative “carrying 
out” of statutes on the other, Foote argues, was the conception shared by the 
Congress that enacted the APA.76 
Foote sees, correctly, that there are really two distinct powers at issue, but 
does not clearly explain the distinction. It is not entirely clear in her account 
what divides statutory construction from “public administration”; Foote 
argues that a court should ask “whether the question on review is necessarily 
a legal question,” or whether it “requires flexibility in application, political 
responsiveness, public participation, factual development, expertise, and 
practical considerations of enforcement and management.”77 Thus she 
suggests Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education,78 a case 
that has all the hallmarks of being genuinely about statutory interpretation,79 
should nevertheless be considered as dealing with “public administration” 
because it involves a “highly technical, specialized interstitial matter.”80 Foote 
 
72 Foote, supra note 16, at 675. 
73 Id. at 678, 680. 
74 Id. at 691. 
75 Id. at 681. 
76 Id. at 682-83, 711. 
77 Id. at 711. 
78 550 U.S. 81 (2007). 
79 The issue was whether the statutory requirement that school funding be calculated by 
excluding the “per-pupil expenditures. . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of 
such expenditures” allowed the agency to exclude from the calculations schools above and below 
these percentiles in terms of total student population. Id. at 84-86 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20 
U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006)). 
80 Foote, supra note 16, at 717-18 (quoting Zuni, 550 U.S. at 90). 
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also does not provide a constitutional account of why agencies may exercise 
this policymaking power at all. 
Some scholars have given an account of Chevron deference using the 
framework of the interpretation-construction distinction. The first to do so was 
Michael Herz.81 More recently, Larry Solum and Cass Sunstein have sought to 
explain Chevron based on this distinction.82 Their work provides the clearest and 
most convincing descriptive and legal accounts of modern deference. The 
specification power has the potential to further refine this work. 
Michael Herz argues that agencies “construct” statutes after courts are 
finished interpreting or “construing” them, and “interpretation has failed to 
produce an answer.”83 Herz explains that Chevron “insists on respect for the 
delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies, but it 
preserves interpretive authority for courts.”84 The “court and the agency are 
making different sorts of decisions. The agency is making a policy decision. 
By definition, within its Chevron space, the agency is unconstrained by the 
statute, which has given out.”85 
Herz follows the nineteenth century scholar Francis Lieber in suggesting 
that interpretation is nothing more than discerning the meaning of words used 
in a statute: “Interpretation [is] the narrower task, consisting of ‘the discovery 
and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas.’”86 
Construction, on the other hand, is the “drawing of conclusions respecting 
subjects, that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known 
from and given in the text—conclusions which are in the spirit, though not 
within the letter of the text.”87 Herz argues that Lieber’s distinction “maps 
tidily onto Chevron, particularly if step one is not especially capacious.”88 In 
other words, once a court finishes understanding Congress’s meaning, it is 
finished with interpretation and can move on to step two, which is construction. 
Solum and Sunstein similarly argue that “there are actually two quite distinct 
Chevron doctrines.”89 They write that interpretation is “about the linguistic 
meaning of [a] term,” whereas construction deals with “the legal effect” of that 
meaning “through implementation rules, specification, and other devices.”90 
What they call “Chevron as Construction” involves no “deference to an agency’s 
 
81 Herz, supra note 16. 
82 Solum & Sunstein, supra note 16. 
83 Herz, supra note 16, at 1883, 1891. 
84 Id. at 1871. 
85 Id. at 1881. 
86 Id. at 1894 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 5 
(William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880)). 
87 Id. (quoting LIEBER, supra note 87, at 44). 
88 Id. at 1895. 
89 Solum & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 3. 
90 Id. at 3-4. 
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view of the linguistic meaning of the statute,” but “insists on judicial deference 
to agency action” only in the “construction zone.”91 
The interpretation-construction distinction is useful, but it requires a 
refinement. In the first place, it is not at all clear that the Founding generation 
ever understood there to be a distinction between interpretation and 
construction.92 Even if the distinction is real, both interpretation and 
construction still appear to have been (and to remain) tasks for judges. The 
judicial duty appears to have always entailed determining what legal effect 
the meanings of statutes have once placed within the context of the existing 
corpus juris.93 For example, a statute that declares killing unlawful, but says 
nothing about attempts, conspiracies, or self-defense, has no “meaning” with 
respect to those other concepts. But judges would nevertheless give legal 
effect to those other concepts (assuming of course that they derive from some 
source of law in the legal system) as part of applying the unlawful killing 
statute.94 In other words, much of what qualifies as “construction” may 
actually historically be part of the judicial power. 
 
91 Id. at 4-5. 
92 Herz recognizes that historically, and still to this day, courts and commentators often use 
the terms interchangeably, as if there is no distinction. Herz, supra note 16, at 1891-92. For an 
originalist argument that the Framers did not distinguish between the two concepts, see John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and 
the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009). 
93 As Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have explained, “Legislatures don’t change the law in a 
vacuum. Like contracting parties, they act in a world already stuffed full of legal rules . . . . In our 
system, at least, new enactments are designed to take their place in an existing corpus juris, as new 
threads in a seamless web.” William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 1079, 1098 (2017). Thus, even once the “meaning” of a statute is clear, the question of legal 
effect is still one for judges: “How does [the legal enactment] fit into the rest of the corpus juris? 
What do ‘the legal sources and authorities, taken all together, establish’? Questions like these 
presuppose some particular system of law, and their answers depend on the other legal rules in 
place.” Id. at 1083 (cleaned up) (quoting 4 JOHN FINNIS, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS 1, 18 (2011)). 
94 Id. at 1099-1100 (using another criminal statutory example). Baude and Sachs also describe 
“the famous case of the two ships Peerless,” in which the two parties to a contract “agreed to send 
cotton on the Peerless, unaware that there were two such ships sailing months apart (and that each 
party had a different ship in mind).” Id. at 1083. The court knows everything there is to know about 
“meaning”—each party to the contract simply had in mind a different ship. “Yet we still have to 
decide the case,” and resolution will depend on those “other legal rules in place.” Id. At a minimum, 
the very fact that Baude and Sachs titled their article “The Law of Interpretation,” whereas 
everything they described Solum would, per a conversation I have recently had with him, label as 
the “law of construction,” suggests that the interpretation-construction distinction is problematic. 
Elsewhere Herz describes the distinction as follows: “In general, interpretation is the process 
for resolving ambiguity; construction is the process for resolving vagueness.” Herz, supra note 16, at 
1898. It is not clear to me that this distinction is correct, either, though it might be partly correct. 
Insofar as “vagueness” involves the scope and reach of legal provisions, rather than their meaning, 
that does appear to point more toward the specification power, although courts may also have a role 
in resolving vagueness using their traditional tools of construction. Insofar as vagueness points 
toward the specification power, it is at most a subset. The specification power entails far more than 
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The specification power is a useful concept whatever one’s position on the 
interpretation-construction distinction. Specification is a subset of construction 
that could be described as a legislative or policymaking power. It is the power 
over this subset of “construction” that the constitutional sources permit the 
executive branch to exercise. Thus, one can believe that it is for the courts to 
exercise power in most of the “construction zone,” while accepting that one piece 
of that zone may nevertheless be equally suitable for the executive branch.95 
II. INTERPRETATION AND SPECIFICATION 
Executive officers routinely interpret law. They must determine for their own 
purposes what the law means to implement and enforce it. This requires that they 
be the first interpreters of the laws. But judges have their own constitutional duty 
to decide what the law is when adjudicating actual cases and controversies, and 
their judgment has historically been final and binding in those cases. 
Yet there comes a point when the law runs out. The law may have nothing 
more to say.96 A judge can conclude to the best of her own judgment that the 
law simply does not require one alternative or another—that it leaves a gap 
within which it is for an agency to specify the details. It turns out that such a 
“specification power” was often exercised in the early Republic. That is to be 
expected: no law can ever specify every particular detail of implementation. 
A. The Executive’s Incidental Interpretation Power 
It has long been observed that administrative agencies and executive 
departments must interpret law as an incident to enforce the law, and did so 
 
resolving vagueness—it involves filling in statutory details when there is simply silence or a grant 
of discretion, either of which may or may not involve vagueness. 
95 Before Chevron became a landmark case, Ronald Levin provided a descriptive account of 
judicial review of agency action very similar to the scheme I propose here. Levin argued that courts 
should always exercise independent judgment over “questions of law,” but sometimes the best legal 
interpretation of Congress’s enactments is that they delegate discretion to the agency. Ronald M. 
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1985). The court’s 
role is always at a minimum to determine the scope of this delegation. Id. at 21 (“Delegations are 
never unbounded. Identifying the restrictions that Congress imposed on its delegate is a form of 
statutory interpretation and hence poses a ‘question of law.’” (footnote omitted)). Within the 
discretionary space, “the agency is not interpreting the legislative will but, instead, responding to a 
legislative invitation to make law.” Id. at 22. This account is consistent with the account presented 
here, although the Chevron Court ultimately took deference in another direction. In addition to 
reviving Levin’s pre-Chevron theoretical model and refining it with a new vocabulary, my aim in the 
next Parts is to support that model with historical antecedents and formalist constitutional theory. 
96 As Justice Kagan recently said in the context of judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulation, a court must first “exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” but “the core 
theory” of judicial deference “is that sometimes the law runs out, and policy-laden choice is what is left 
over.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (citations omitted). That is exactly right. I would just 
add: if the law has run out, then what is there to interpret?   
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since the early years of the Republic. Early on Congress instructed heads of 
departments “to superintend” the business of the various departments.97 
When confronted with claims by individual customs collectors that the 
requirement of their oath of office to execute their offices “according to law” 
required each collector to follow the law as each collector understood it, 
Alexander Hamilton, as Treasury Secretary, instructed his collectors: 
The power of superintending the collection of the revenue, as incident to the 
duty of doing it, comprises, in my opinion, among a variety of particulars not 
necessary to be specified, the right of settling, for the government of the 
officers employed in the collection of the several branches of the revenue, the 
construction of the laws relating to the revenue, in all cases of doubt.98 
This power of construction was necessary lest “the most incongruous 
practices upon the same laws might obtain in different districts of the United 
States,” and was “essential to uniformity and system in the execution of the 
laws.”99 Thus, over time, Hamilton instructed his collectors on several points 
of law, including, for example, whether a vessel had to pay tonnage at each 
entry and whether exports returned for lack of a foreign market was liable to 
pay duties.100 
Although the executive departments had to interpret law as an incident 
to enforcement, they did not have the power of final judgments. That is, the 
executive could interpret the law for its purposes, but if a court confronted 
that law through a case or controversy, the court would have final say (at least 
in that particular case) over what the law required. As Leonard White has 
written, “[e]xcept for the withholding or revocation of a privilege,” no 
sanction was “at the disposal of administrative officials,” not even the heads 
of departments.101 “[P]enalties and forfeitures were imposed by [a] judge,” 
which “gave the court opportunity to decide upon the legality and correctness 
 
97 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 204 
(1948) (first citing Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66, then citing Act of Feb. 20, 1792, 
ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 232, 234). Congress settled on the standard phrase, “subject to the superintendence, 
control and direction of the department of the treasury, according to the authorities and duties of 
the respective officers thereof.” Id. (quoting Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 47, § 4, 1 Stat. 376, 378). 
98 Id. at 204-05 (quoting Revenue Circular from Alexander Hamilton to the Treasury 
Department (July 20, 1792), in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 557-59 (John C. 
Hamilton ed., 1850) [hereinafter Revenue Circular]). 
99 Id. at 205 (quoting Revenue Circular, supra note 98, at 557-59), see also HAMBURGER, supra 
note 38, at 89-90 (discussing the same letter). 
100 WHITE, supra note 97, at 207. Whether any of these are more properly understood as 
exercises of the specification power will depend on a careful analysis of the statutes Hamilton was 
implementing. This question is not necessary to resolve at this juncture. 
101 Id. at 446. 
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of official action.”102 Even in Hamilton’s circular to his collectors in which he 
explained the necessity of a centralized executive exposition of the laws, he 
recognized that “a remedy, in a large proportion of the cases, might be 
obtained from the courts of justice.”103 Or, as he wrote in The Federalist No. 
78, “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. . . . It therefore belongs to them to ascertain [the] meaning [of the 
Constitution], as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from 
the legislative body.”104 
The Supreme Court confirmed early on that courts had final interpretive 
authority over statutes, even though the interpretation of law requires discretion 
on the part of the executive as well. In the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding,105 the 
Court recognized that law-interpretation often left much room for discretion 
and thus the Court would not compel the executive to adopt one interpretation 
over another through a writ of mandamus.106 “[I]n the administration of the 
various and important concerns of his office,” Chief Justice Taney wrote, the 
head of a department “must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and 
resolutions of Congress, under which he is from time to time required to act.”107 
The Court also noted, however, that should a case come before the Court in a 
more traditional mode, it would be up to the Court to decide the law for itself.108 
In a traditional non-mandamus case “which involved the construction of any of 
these laws,” Chief Justice Taney wrote, “the Court certainly would not be bound 
to adopt the construction given by the head of a department” because in such 
cases it is the judges’ “duty to interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain 
the rights of the parties in the cause before them.”109 
 
102 Id. Jerry Mashaw confirms this early history, and that finality of judgment was reserved for 
courts in other administrative statutes as well. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 105 (2012) (noting that no penalties would be imposed upon a shipowner 
“unless the U.S. Attorney for the district brought an action against the vessel or the owner and 
prevailed on the merits.”); id. at 130 (“The statutes providing for land commission adjudication of 
private claims made commission determinations final against the United States, but not against third 
party claimants. These latter claims would have to be fought out in the courts.”). 
103 WHITE, supra note 97, at 205 (quoting Revenue Circular, supra note 99, at 557-59). 
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
105 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). 
106 Id. at 515. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. This element of the case is discussed in Bamzai, supra note 8, at 952. As explained, 
although the courts did defer to executive interpretations of law, they did so only according to two 
canons of statutory construction that afforded weight to such interpretations if they were 
contemporaneous with the enactment of the law itself, or were longstanding, in which case they 
would be good evidence of what the law actually was. Id. at 916-17. 
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Similarly, in United States v. Dickson, the Court pronounced that, 
notwithstanding “the uniform construction” given to an act by the treasury 
department for two decades: 
[I]t is not to be forgotten, that ours is a government of laws, and not of men; 
and that the Judicial Department has imposed upon it, by the Constitution, 
the solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort; and however 
disagreeable that duty may be, in cases where its own judgment shall differ 
from that of other high functionaries, it is not at liberty to surrender, or to 
waive it.110 
In short, executive officers have, and always have had, an incidental power, 
indeed a duty, to interpret the law in order to execute it. But this 
interpretation power was only incidental, and it was not final. The courts had 
final judgment over the interpretation of statutes at least in those cases and 
controversies that came properly before them.111 
B. The Executive’s Specification Power 
Since the beginning of the Republic, the executive department has 
exercised another power, one distinct in kind from the incidental executive 
power of interpretation. This power has been referred to with different 
terminology. Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have recently suggested the 
existence of a power similar to what is contemplated here, and referred to it 
as the President’s “completion power.”112 It is a power that the early 
administrative theorists described as the power to “express the will of the 
state as to details where it is inconvenient for the legislature to act.”113 This is 
the power that administrators exercise when the statutory requirements are 
clear, but simply do not specify a course of action.114 
 
110 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841). 
111 The separation of powers scholar M.J.C. Vile elegantly explains the difference between the 
executive’s incidental power of interpretation, and the supreme interpretation power of the courts 
in cases amenable to judicial review, as follows: 
The difference between these [executive] interpretations and those of the judge, 
however, is the authoritative quality of the judicial interpretation, whereas those of 
other officials, although usually accepted as valid, are in principle subject to review. 
The importance of this distinction cannot be lost sight of in the constitutional system 
of government . . . . 
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 360-61 (2d ed. 1998). 
112 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2282. 
113 FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 17 (1900). 
114 The choice of the term “specification” over “completion” might now be clearer. When the 
executive exercises this power (whatever it is), it is not really “completing” the law, which most 
assuredly remains incomplete. It has merely filled in a particular detail in a particular context where 
the statute happened not to specify a particular course of action. When the executive acts to fill this 
 
710 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 689 
1. Early Examples 
The instances of this power’s exercise in the early years of the Republic 
are legion, and few raised any controversy. The first collection act of 1789 
directed only that shipowners keep manifests of their goods.115 This provision 
of law was not ambiguous; it simply did not specify the course of action in 
many details. It was left to Hamilton to create the forms and procedures to 
be used at the Treasury, which included the precise form to be used for the 
manifest of imported goods and merchandise by shipowners,116 the precise 
form of the certification of the manifests to be made by customs officials,117 
the form to be used to report on spirits brought by the vessel,118 and many 
other details of administration. Congress subsequently adopted these 
procedures in the Collection Act of 1799.119 
In 1798, Congress enacted legislation “to provide for the valuation of 
Lands and Dwelling-Houses, and the enumeration of Slaves within the 
United States.”120 This statute granted significant discretion to the executive 
branch to fill in statutory details. The statute assigned existing counties to 
various divisions for purposes of the act, and provided that if any new county 
is formed out of two existing counties belonging to two different divisions, 
“then the commissioners to be appointed in pursuance of this act, shall 
determine to which of such divisions it shall belong.”121 It also provided that 
the first meeting of the commissioners shall be “at such time and place as shall 
be appointed and directed by the commissioner for each state, first named 
and qualified, according to this act.”122 The commissioners were empowered 
“to divide their respective states into a suitable and convenient number of 
assessment districts,” as well as to appoint a principal assessor and “such 
number of respectable freeholders to be assistant assessors, as they shall judge 
necessary for carrying this act into effect,” provided that the Secretary of 
Treasury had power to alter the number of districts and assessors.123 More 
substantively, the commissioners were required “to establish all such 
regulations” necessary to effectuate the assessments, “[p]ursuant to which 
regulations and instructions” the commissioners shall cause the assessors to 
 
gap, it is specifying a particular course of action in a particular case; it cannot really be said to be 
completing the statute, which might never cease requiring new specifications. 
115 WHITE, supra note 97, at 206 (explaining that Hamilton first devised these procedures); see 
also Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 4, 10, 1 Stat. 29, 36, 38. 
116 Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 23, 1 Stat. 627, 644–45. 
117 Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 646–47. 
118 Id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 649–51. 
119 WHITE, supra note 97, at 206 & n.17 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627). 
120 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, 1 Stat. 580. 
121 Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 580–83. 
122 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 584. 
123 Id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 584–85. 
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value and enumerate houses, lands, and slaves, according to the principles 
established by Congress.124 
Even where a statute was entirely silent, the executive sometimes filled in 
details out of necessity. For example, the Treasury and other departments 
created an entire class of disbursement personnel not specifically authorized 
by law, but which these departments found necessary to ensure the proper 
appropriation of funds for various activities.125 In another entertaining 
example, Congress directed that surveyors mark the corners of townships 
with trees; but “[n]ature was not so kind,” and subsequent regulations 
permitted the use of stones.126 
Jerry Mashaw has detailed numerous statutes, some only a single line long, 
granting tremendous discretion to administrative agencies to fill in statutory 
details.127 One statute of particular interest provided that the military 
pensions which had been granted and paid by the states pursuant to the acts 
of the Confederation Congress to the wounded and disabled veterans of the 
Revolutionary War “shall be continued and paid by the United States, from 
the fourth day of March last, for the space of one year, under such regulations 
as the President of the United States may direct.”128 President Washington’s 
regulations stated that the sums owed were to be paid in “two equal 
payments,” the first on March 5, 1790, and the second on June 5, 1790; and 
that each application for payment was to be accompanied by vouchers and 
affidavits affirming that the invalid served in a particular regiment or vessel 
at the time he was disabled.129 
This is a particularly clear example of an executive officer exercising a 
power not of interpretation, but of specification. The regulation that the 
payments were to be made in two equal payments three months apart was, to 
 
124 Id. § 8, 1 Stat. at 585. 
125 WHITE, supra note 97, at 340-41. 
126 MASHAW, supra note 102, at 126. 
127 In an early statute establishing post roads, Congress granted the Postmaster General “the 
authority to provide for additional post roads and to decide where to set up post offices,” and “full 
authority to contract for the carriage of mail by whatever devices he thought ‘most expedient’ and 
to prescribe regulations for his subordinates as he found necessary.” Id. at 46. Mashaw discusses 
several other examples. Id. at 47 (noting that in the statute authorizing the Bank of the United 
States, “all of the Bank’s operating policies—including when and where to establish branches—were 
left to the regulations to be adopted by the Bank’s directors . . . .”); id. at 135 (explaining that 
Congress gave authority to registers and receivers of land offices to make corrections so long as 
buyers provided “testimony satisfactory to the register and receiver of public moneys” (quoting Act 
of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 98, 3 Stat. 526)); id. at 192 (describing how steamboat inspectors were “authorized 
to adopt any means they thought necessary to test the sufficiency of a steamboat or its equipment”). 
128 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95. 
129 These regulations are preserved in the Library of Congress, and can be viewed at An Act Providing 
for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, (Oct. 13, 1789), reprinted in LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.21201200/?st=text [https://perma.cc/R29C-C9SU]. 
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be sure, a reasonable interpretation of the statute, which required the 
payments to be made within one year. Yet many other options were available: 
daily installments for the entire year, or perhaps three installments at varying 
intervals over the course of a year. Each of these options, in and of itself, 
would have been a reasonable interpretation of the statute. In other words, 
the result of the executive’s choice would have been a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute, but the act of choosing among these various possible 
interpretations was itself not an interpretive act. Nothing in the statute bore 
on which regulation to choose. All of the options would have been reasonable 
because all fell within the boundaries of the statute. Choosing among these 
options was a pure matter of policy—an act of specification. 
2. Youngstown 
Goldsmith and Manning argue that the President’s action in the 
Youngstown steel seizure case may be best understood as an exercise of the 
specification (what they call completion) power.130 At the height of the 
Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing the 
Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate steel mills subject to ongoing 
labor disputes and nationwide strikes.131 The case assessing the validity of the 
President’s action is often celebrated for Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, 
in which he offered a three-part framework for assessing the lawfulness of an 
exercise of executive power depending on whether Congress has authorized 
that exercise of power, was silent with respect to it, or prohibited it.132 
Goldsmith and Manning argue that Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent may 
have had the better framework.133 In that dissent, Vinson noted that “[t]he 
absence of a specific statute authorizing seizure of the steel mills as a mode 
of executing the laws—both the military procurement program and the anti-
inflation program—has not until today been thought to prevent the President 
 
130 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Goldsmith & Manning, 
supra note 28, at 2282-87. 
131 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583; Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 28, at 2283. 
132 The three-part framework was stated as follows: (1) “When the President acts pursuant to 
an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all 
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate”; (2) “[w]hen the President 
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain,” and thus “any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law”; and (3) “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
133 See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2282. 
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from executing the laws.”134 Numerous precedents “amply demonstrate[d] 
that Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the 
country whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the 
particular method of execution.”135 These precedents, according to Goldsmith 
and Manning, are examples of “a completion power” that “enables the 
President to go beyond (but not against) the implemental prescriptions of 
particular statutes, when necessary to effectuate the legislative program.”136 
Goldsmith and Manning argue that the only limit on the President’s 
power was the point at which “the executive’s actions implementing a statute 
cross a line from something that is reasonably incidental to a statutory 
command into something that looks more like new lawmaking.”137 This 
analysis requires a modification. An exercise of the specification power may 
not cross the line into “new lawmaking,” and yet it may still be unlawful 
precisely because it goes beyond the statute. The range of options that may 
be specified is still limited by the interpretation power. For this reason, my 
sense is that President Truman’s action was still unlawful: no statute really 
came close to giving him the power to seize the mills, and there was no real 
“gap” to fill at all. There was simply no law.138 
Regardless of how Youngstown would come out under an analysis of the 
specification power, the upshot is simply that sometimes there is no more 
interpretation to do, yet the statute still leaves “gaps” to fill. Either through 
an explicit grant of discretion or statutory silence, the executive has a power 
to fill in the details of the statutory scheme where the legislature could not 
conveniently act or foresee all eventualities. The limit on the specification 
power is not the reasonableness of the agency’s exercise of interpretive power, 
but rather the scope and breadth of the gap left by the statute as determined 
by the interpretation power. The only other limits on the specification power 
are the nondelegation doctrine—the point at which the gap the executive is 
seeking to fill is simply too big—and the reasonableness requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.139 
 
134 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701-02 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
135 Id. at 700. 
136 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2285. 
137 Id. at 2308. 
138 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-86 (“There are two statutes which do authorize the 
President to take both personal and real property under certain conditions. However, the 
Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted 
in either of the statutes.” (footnote omitted)). 
139 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). 
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3. An Analogy 
At this point, the reader may not be convinced that the powers of 
interpretation and specification are really distinct. It may therefore be helpful 
to draw an analogy that demonstrates that the distinction between 
interpretation and specification is common in ordinary human interactions. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that two parents tell their children, 
“Go make breakfast.” If the children serve up a plate of stones and leaves, 
they have misinterpreted the instruction. Suppose now that they bring pizza 
for breakfast instead. This may create a difficult question, but it is an 
interpretive question: is pizza the kind of thing we ordinarily consider to be 
included in “breakfast”? Reasonable judges might disagree, but the question 
is nevertheless an interpretive one—that is, whether pizza even falls within 
the scope of the permissible options.140 
Suppose the children are instead confronting the choice whether to make 
eggs and bacon, waffles, or bagels. That choice involves no interpretation 
whatsoever. Each of these options would fall within the meaning of breakfast, 
and therefore fall within the scope of the permissible options. If pizza were 
interpreted to be included within the meaning of breakfast, then the children 
could add pizza for consideration, too—at least after a determination that it 
falls within the meaning of breakfast. However, the choice among these 
options, each of which would be a reasonable interpretation of the instruction, 
is itself not an interpretive choice. It is a pure policymaking choice. The 
children would be exercising discretion to “specify” the course of action 
within the bounds of the parents’ instruction. 
Although it is not always easy to see in complicated statutes, this 
distinction between interpretation and specification always exists, even if 
judges do not always agree, as a matter of interpretation, whether an option 
falls within the bounds of the permissible and is thus amenable to the 
specification power. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS 
As explained above, no previous work has provided a formalist account of 
this specification power. Goldsmith and Manning come closest to providing 
such an account in their “completion power” article, but their account requires 
 
140 This suggests my disagreement with Peter Strauss. Whereas Strauss’s “Chevron space” 
exists between the zone where the statute clearly permits an action and the zone where it clearly 
prohibits an action, see  Strauss, supra note 12, at 1161-65, the space between these zones of clarity 
may still call for interpretation. See also, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 843, 845 (2016) (arguing that in matters of constitutional interpretation judges have the 
duty to “use the ample methods of clarification available to clarify the precise meaning of the 
Constitution”). 
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further refinement. First, like the rest of the literature, they treat 
“interpretation” and “completion” as the same, and therefore are unable to 
resolve the Article III problem.141 Second, their argument in favor of the 
completion power rests largely on Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent in 
Youngstown; they give only cursory analysis to the Constitution’s text and 
structure.142 This Part supplies the constitutional argument from the text and 
structure of both the legislative-power and executive-power provisions of the 
Constitution, thereby supporting a formalist or originalist case for deference 
of a certain sort. This approach should also appeal to the adherents of other 
contemporary methods of constitutional interpretation that also value textual 
and historical arguments.143 
A. Nonexclusive Legislative Power 
Wayman v. Southard,144 the Court’s first major nondelegation case,145 is the 
first source of constitutional support for the specification power. In that case, 
Chief Justice John Marshall elaborated upon the meaning of the grant of 
“legislative power” to Congress in the Constitution. The 1792 Process Act at 
issue in Wayman established that the practices prevailing in each respective 
state supreme court as of 1789, respecting “the forms of writs and executions” 
and the “modes of process . . . in suits at common law,” would govern in 
 
141 The authors argue that 
[t]he Chevron doctrine appears to reflect the idea that while Congress can legitimately 
give either courts or agencies ultimate authority to resolve statutory ambiguities or fill 
up statutory interstices, it is more consistent with the background premises of our 
constitutional democracy to embrace a default rule that Congress prefers to leave such 
completion power in the hands of the more accountable executive. 
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2299 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
142 They briefly argue that this completion power may inhere in either the Vesting Clause or 
the Take Care Clause, but ultimately rely on an analogy to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 
2303-06. They note that there are reasons why such a clause might have been included in Article I, 
without the negative implication that therefore there is no similar implied power in Article II (or 
Article III). Id. at 2306. 
143 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, A Nonoriginalism for Originalists, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1445-46 
(2016) (noting that under a “pluralistic or eclectic approach to constitutional interpretation,” 
interpreters “use multiple modes of inquiry, including those based on constitutional text, history, 
and structure, on legal and political precedent, or on practical consequences, without necessarily 
privileging any one in particular”). 
144 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
145 An earlier case, Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, in which the Court upheld 
Congress’s conditioning of the existence of an embargo on a presidential finding of non-neutrality 
among foreign states, is also taken as a nondelegation case. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383, 388 (1813). 
It is not particularly controversial, however, and the Court did not give any sustained treatment to 
a nondelegation principle. 
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federal court proceedings in those states.146 The statute included a proviso: 
subject to the rules and regulations prescribed by the federal courts.147 The 
nondelegation question in Wayman (which the Court did not even have to 
decide148) was whether this proviso was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power to the courts. 
The plaintiff in Wayman had sought an execution of judgment against the 
defendant in hard currency.149 The defendant sought the application of a 1792 
Kentucky law providing that a plaintiff must accept state paper currency in 
satisfaction of a judgment.150 The Court agreed with the plaintiff that the 1792 
Kentucky law did not govern in a federal court suit at common law because 
the federal acts provided that only those state practices established as of 1789 
applied.151 The defendant then pressed a nondelegation argument: the 1792 
Process Act for the governing of process and suits at common law would be 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in light of its proviso, if 
that proviso were interpreted to extend to matters outside of courtroom 
proceedings and to the manner of executions. Thus, Congress could not have 
 
146 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 27. The statute enacted the following: 
That the forms of writs, executions, and other process, except their style and the forms 
and modes of proceeding in suits in those of common law, shall be the same as are now 
used in the said Courts respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled, ‘An act to regulate 
processes in the courts of the United States,’ . . . except so far as may have been 
provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States; subject 
however to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall in their 
discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of the United 
States shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district 
court concerning the same. 
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872); Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 31. The “act” 
referred to in the quoted statute above was the 1789 Act providing that “the forms of writs and executions, 
except their style, and modes of process . . . , in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall 
be the same in each state respectively, as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.” Act of 
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1872); Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 26-27. 
147 The process prescribed was subject to “such alterations and additions as the said Courts 
respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court 
of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule, to prescribe to any Circuit or 
District Court concerning the same.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 31. 
148 The Court noted, 
But the question respecting the right of the Courts to alter the modes of proceeding 
in suits at common law, established in the Process Act, does not arise in this case. That 
is not the point on which the Judges at the circuit were divided, and which they have 
adjourned to this Court. The question really adjourned is, whether the laws of 
Kentucky respecting executions, passed subsequent to the Process Act, are applicable 
to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the Federal Courts? 
Id. at 48-49. 
149 Id. at 2. 
150 Id. at 2-3. 
151 Id. at 32, 41. 
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intended for it to reach outside the courtroom to the manner in which a 
judgment was executed.152 Indeed, a regulation requiring the acceptance of 
state bank notes affected not only how one would be divested of property, but 
also of how much property.153 
The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the law did in fact 
reach to matters outside of courtroom procedures to all “‘proceedings in suits’ 
at common law,” including execution of judgments.154 Chief Justice Marshall 
proceeded to address the nondelegation argument. He wrote: “It will not be 
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, 
powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may 
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully 
exercise itself.”155 The Judiciary Act and the Process Act “empower the Courts 
respectively to regulate their practice,” and “[i]t certainly will not be contended, 
that this might not be done by Congress.”156 Yet it also “will not be contended” 
that “mak[ing] rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing 
of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same 
description . . . may not be conferred on the judicial department.”157 
“The line has not been exactly drawn,” Chief Justice Marshall continued, 
“which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated 
by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general 
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such 
general provisions to fill up the details.”158 In other words, the power to make 
rules “fill[ing] up the details” of a general legislative provision is a kind of 
nonexclusive legislative power, a power partly but not wholly legislative in 
character and which Congress can exercise itself but which it can also confer 
on one of the other departments. 
 
152 Id. at 13-17, 42. 
153 See id. at 32, 42. According to the reporter, defendant’s counsel had argued: 
All the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress. Supposing Congress to 
have power, under the clause, for making all laws necessary and proper, &c. to make 
laws for executing the judicial power of the Union, it cannot delegate such power to 
the judiciary. The rules by which the citizen shall be deprived of his liberty or property, 
to enforce a judicial sentence, ought to be prescribed and known; and the power to 
prescribe such rules belongs exclusively to the legislative department. 
Id. at 13-14. 
Indeed, some scholars have argued that, because this rule would have deprived an individual of private 
property, it ought to be considered exclusively legislative and nondelegable, contrary to Marshall’s dictum 
that we shall soon encounter. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 38, at 393. That may be correct, and for 
present purposes it does not matter whether Marshall’s dictum in this respect is correct. 
154 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)  at 36. 
155 Id. at 42-43. 
156 Id. at 43. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Chief Justice Marshall then assessed whether the power delegated by the 
proviso was an impermissible delegation—that is, whether it fell within the 
class of powers that was “exclusively legislative.” He observed that the Act 
permitted the courts to specify where the executive officer might keep the 
goods of the debtor until the day of sale; to specify how notice is to be given 
before the execution of a judgment; and to specify whether the sale can be 
made on credit.159 Chief Justice Marshall thus recognized that a broad 
statutory provision might call for an exercise of what we have called the 
“specification” power to fill in interstitial legislative details, where there was no 
more interpretation to be done. Because it is quite impossible for Congress to 
anticipate every detail of implementation, there must exist this class of 
nonexclusive legislative power “to fill up the details” of a statutory scheme.160 
B. The Prerogative Specification Power 
Although the Process Act of 1792 explicitly delegated the power to the 
courts to “specify” particular details of that law, there may be other sources 
of constitutional power for the executive to specify at least certain kinds of 
details even in the absence of an explicit delegation to make regulations. The 
first possible source is the Take Care Clause; the second, more likely source 
is the Vesting Clause. 
A specification power could inhere in the President’s duty to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed, assuming this textual provision is also a grant 
of power. If Congress left a detail to be specified, even if it did so 
unknowingly and even if it did not explicitly grant the executive the power 
to make regulations, how are executive officers to execute the laws faithfully 
without providing for that detail of implementation? This is what we 
ordinarily mean when we say a statute has a “gap.” In Chevron itself, the 
agency was required to regulate “stationary sources.”161 To execute this 
 
159 Id. at 44-46. 
160 This view is also consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis in Marbury, where he 
argued that where a statute (or the Constitution) gave the President discretion to act, such discretion 
was generally not examinable by a court; only where a statute gave more specific instructions were 
the President’s actions pursuant to such statute examinable by the courts. Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, said: 
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments . . . merely . . . act 
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be 
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific 
duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it 
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to 
the laws of his country for a remedy. 
Id. 
161 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859-62 (1984). 
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instruction, the agency had to decide what to consider as a stationary source 
when more than one of the statutory definitions applied.162 This gap had to 
be filled, in other words, for the law to be faithfully executed. 
John Marshall, this time as a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 1800, hinted that such a specification power belonged to 
the executive even absent an explicit delegation from Congress. Commenting 
on the enforcement of a treaty and the President’s duty “to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed,” Marshall wrote that Congress may 
unquestionably “prescribe the mode” by which the President is to execute the 
treaty, but, he added, “till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive 
department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.”163 
Chief Justice Vinson, for his part, surveyed the historical sources in his 
Youngstown dissent and concluded that such precedents “amply demonstrate[] 
that Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the 
country whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the 
particular method of execution.”164 
Because the Take Care Clause may not even be a grant of power, the Vesting 
Clause is the more likely source of the specification power.165 There is a debate 
in the executive power literature over the precise meaning of “the executive 
power” vested in the President, and the structure of Article II more broadly. 
Michael McConnell reflects and refines the prevailing formalist account in a 
recent study and argues that all historically executive powers are vested in the 
executive department, subject to express limitations elsewhere in the text.166 
The Vesting Clause vests the President with all the executive powers,167 but the 
various executive-prerogative powers listed in Blackstone were then distributed 
across the national government.168 For example, the Constitution grants 
 
162 Id. 
163 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 684 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 614 (1800)). 
164 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
165 The Take Care Clause is written as a duty—a limitation on how the law is to be executed—
and therefore seems not to be a grant of power. 
166 Michael McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
167 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States . . . .”). 
168 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 166, at 55-56. McConnell writes that William Crosskey 
“was the first to note that the enumeration of powers by the Committee of Detail was as much about 
legislative-executive separation of powers as it was about federalism.” Id. at 46; see also 1 WILLIAM 
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 466 (1953), describing Congress’s 
making a threefold division of power within the new national government, and . . . 
vest[ing] in Congress many . . . ‘executive’ powers . . . [which] were much more 
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Congress the historically prerogative powers over war and peace, letters of 
marque and reprisal, and coining money (among other such powers);169 it 
grants the Senate a say in the appointment and treaty powers;170 and it grants 
courts equity jurisdiction.171 If the specification power is a prerogative power 
not limited elsewhere in the text, then it is vested in the executive.172 
The executive in Britain was historically understood to have a kind of 
specification power. Both John Locke and William Blackstone describe a 
prerogative power to fill in legislative details as an incident to enforcement 
even in the absence of explicit legislative direction. Locke wrote that because 
legislators are not “able to foresee, and provide, by Laws, for all, that may be 
useful to the Community,” the executive has a power to exercise a legislative 
power “in many Cases, where the municipal Law has given no direction, till 
the Legislative can conveniently be Assembled to provide for it.”173 Locke 
goes on to say that because the lawmaking body is too numerous and slow and 
not always in being, “and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by 
laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the 
publick,” there is therefore “a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many 
things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.”174 The prerogative power, 
in other words, “can be nothing, but the Peoples permitting their Rulers, to 
do several things of their own free choice, where the Law was silent . . . .”175 
 
important determinants of the particular enumeration of Congressional powers . . . 
than was the desire of making clear the powers which Congress was to have, and the 
powers which it was not to have, as against the states. 
See also generally id. at 415-28, 429-32, 454, 464-66 (discussing the English executive-prerogative powers 
and the division of the powers across the three federal branches in the United States Constitution). 
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
170 Id. art. II, § 2. 
171 Id. art. III, § 2. 
172 In the “Decision of 1789,” Congress seems to have adopted this view of Article II. James 
Madison argued that 
[t]he constitution affirms, that the executive power shall be vested in the President. 
Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there are. The constitution says, that in 
appointing to office, the Senate shall be associated with the President, unless in the 
case of inferior officers . . . . Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not. 
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison). See also id. at 
516 (statement of Rep. Madison) (“[T]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States. The association of the Senate with the President in exercising that particular function, is an 
exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly.”). 
173 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government § 159, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 392 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690). 
174 Id. § 160 at 393. 
175 Id. § 164 at 395. 
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Locke then adds, contrary to Blackstone (see below), that sometimes this 
power can go against “the direct Letter of the Law, for the publick good.”176 
Blackstone, whose work heavily influenced the Founders,177 described a 
prerogative power more along the lines presented here. “For, though the 
making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the legislative branch, 
of the sovereign power,” wrote Blackstone, “yet the manner, time, and 
circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to 
the discretion of the executive magistrate.”178 Therefore, the executive’s edicts 
or proclamations on these points (its executive orders and regulations) “are 
binding upon the subject, where they do not either contradict the old laws, or 
tend to establish new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws as are 
already in being, in such manner as the king shall judge necessary.”179 If this 
power to specify the details necessary to enforce a law is a prerogative power, 
as Blackstone seems to describe, then it is vested in the executive department 
because such a power is not otherwise limited by the constitutional text. 
For what it is worth, I am not convinced that the standard formalist 
account is correct. As Julian Mortenson has written in two recent and 
important papers, one forthcoming in the pages of this law review, historically 
“the executive power” was likely understood to refer only to law-execution 
and not to all of the King’s prerogative powers.180 I think Mortenson is 
probably right. But, as I am developing in another work, even on the law 
execution account of the Vesting Clause there may be a “thick” version of “the 
executive power” that plausibly includes the powers to appoint, control, and 
remove executive officers and, perhaps, Blackstone’s proclamation power.181 
Blackstone describes this power under the same heading under which he 
discusses “the executive power of the laws,” and states that this proclamation 
 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593-94 (2008) (noting that 
Blackstone’s works “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding 
generation” (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)); CROSSKEY, supra note 168, at 416 
(describing the Constitution’s distribution of prerogative powers listed in Blackstone); Gary L. 
McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 626, 640 (1999) (calling Blackstone the “most dominant source of authority on the common 
law for those who wrote and ratified the Constitution”). But see generally Martin Jordan Minot, Note, 
The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking the Eighteenth-Century Importance of the Commentaries, 104 
VA. L. REV. 1359 (2018) (arguing that Blackstone was far less influential on the Founders than is 
commonly believed). 
178 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261. 
179 Id. 
180  Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1169-70 (2019); Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. 
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2020). 
181 See Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative (Oct. 28, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3472108 [https://perma.cc/YW56-BKDB]. 
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power extends simply to the “manner, time, and circumstances of putting 
those laws in execution”182 and to “enforce the execution of such laws as are 
already in being.”183 Thus, even if “the executive power” refers only to the 
power to carry into execution preexisting laws, that power very well may 
include this proclamation power. 
One final observation may be useful. The precise scope of the 
specification power may vary depending on its source. The scope of the 
executive’s inherent specification power may not be commensurate with the 
scope of the specification power expressly delegated by Congress. There may 
be details of implementation that are impermissible for the executive to enact 
in the absence of such a delegation. Blackstone’s description of a power to 
implement the “manner, time, and circumstances” of enforcement may not 
entail, for example, the power to create interstitial rules that affect the legal 
rights of individuals. It may, on the other hand, be permissible for Congress 
to delegate the power to the executive to specify such details, depending on 
one’s theory of delegation. To be sure, if it is impermissible altogether for 
Congress to make such a delegation—if the making of any rule, no matter 
how minor or interstitial, that affects private rights or conduct is an exercise 
of “exclusively” legislative power—then there may be no variance between 
the scope of the specification power rooted in the executive power clause and 
the scope of the specification power rooted in legislative delegation. For our 
purposes, the important point is that whatever the precise scope and limits of 
the specification power when rooted in these different constitutional sources, 
such a power exists. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
This Part revisits the debates with which this Article began, and shows 
how they can be advanced or at least clarified. It shows how several of the 
Court’s rationales in Chevron are unsupportable, but some are valid as to the 
specification power. Finally, it discusses the limitations of the present 
argument, and ends with a footnote on the nondelegation doctrine. All told, 
properly distinguishing between executive interpretation and specification 
allows us to understand how judges would operate in a world without Chevron 
deference. They would resolve for themselves all matters of interpretation, 
including ambiguities; but where the statute, on its best reading, leaves a gap 
to be filled, the judges would permit the executive to specify the details within 
the limits of such gaps. 
 
182 BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *261. 
183 Id. 
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A. Judging in a World Without Chevron 
1. Advancing the Debates 
In their article on the completion power, Goldsmith and Manning write 
that the completion power may justify Chevron deference notwithstanding the 
apparent violation of Article III and the APA. In light of such hurdles, it 
“remains necessary to identify a legal justification” for why “Congress would 
prefer agencies rather than courts to have binding authority to resolve residual 
ambiguities.”184 According to them, the best explanation for Chevron “is that 
executive branch officials are endowed with presumptive constitutional 
authority, grounded in Article II, to complete an ambiguous statutory scheme 
unless Congress specifies otherwise.”185 Yet, if the powers of interpretation and 
completion (or specification) are in fact distinct, as argued here, no legal 
justification is necessary. The courts need not, and cannot consistently with 
Article III, defer to an agency’s exercise of the interpretation power. But the 
courts certainly can defer to the executive’s constitutionally rooted 
specification or interstitial lawmaking power. It would not even be appropriate 
to call it “deference,” because judges would simply have no authority in this 
domain except to ensure that the agency stays within the limits of the gap 
created by the statute and does not act arbitrarily and capriciously.186 
Moreover, Goldsmith and Manning treat “resolv[ing] residual 
ambiguities” as tantamount to the completion power, as they do elsewhere.187 
Others have similarly argued that resolving statutory ambiguities should be 
treated as an exercise of policymaking rather than interpretation.188 But 
neither Goldsmith and Manning, nor these other scholars, defend this view; 
none provides an argument for why the resolution of ambiguities is in fact an 
exercise of policymaking discretion rather than interpretation. To be sure, 
they very well might be the same power if one adopts the legal realist view 
that all interpretive power inherently entails lawmaking. 
 
184 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2301 (footnote omitted). 
185 Id. 
186 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018) (stating that reviewing courts are to “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency actions . . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law”). 
187 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2301. For example, they write: 
The Chevron doctrine appears to reflect the idea that while Congress can legitimately 
give either courts or agencies ultimate authority to resolve statutory ambiguities or fill 
up statutory interstices, it is more consistent with the background premises of our 
constitutional democracy to embrace a default rule that Congress prefers to leave such 
completion power in the hands of the more accountable executive. 
Id. at 2299 (emphasis added). 
188 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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If one rejects that view, then resolving genuine “ambiguity,” as opposed to 
specifying the details within statutory gaps where the statute is otherwise clear, 
is most likely an exercise of the interpretation power. Determining the meaning, 
scope, and application of a statutory command is a quintessential interpretive 
task on the pre-realist understanding. Although there is some literature 
suggesting different possible meanings of “ambiguity”189—and, as explained 
here, ambiguity is often conflated with other concepts such as gaps or 
silences190—at a minimum ambiguity entails the proposition that a particular 
linguistic command is susceptible to more than one meaning in a particular 
context.191 And ascertaining the legal effect of statutes in light of ambiguous 
meaning has always been understood to be a judicial task.192 Resolving 
ambiguities, in other words, is up to the judge: she must decide whether “pizza” 
is included within “breakfast.” But once she decides that it is, the choice of 
whether to go with pizza or something else is a matter of specification.193 
Bednar and Hickman’s claim that Chevron is “inevitable” can now also be 
clarified. When they write that calls for Chevron’s demise “fail to take into 
account that Chevron deference, or something much like it, is a necessary 
consequence of and corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on 
agencies to exercise substantial policymaking discretion to resolve statutory 
details,”194 that proposition need no longer be objectionable to Chevron 
 
189 See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare 
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 
791, 799-802 (2010) (describing numerous academic approaches to defining “ambiguity”). 
190 For instance, Professor Siegel, in his recent defense of Chevron, stated that the power 
conferred by a statutory ambiguity “should not be regarded as interpretive power, but as the power 
to make a policy choice.” Siegel, supra note 12, at 965. Siegel does not defend this view, however, 
and as explained, it seems that it can only be sustained by the legal realist position that all acts of 
interpretation inherently entail lawmaking. See supra note 12. Moreover, if resolving ambiguities is 
not an interpretive task, then it is unclear what exactly is left for interpretation at all—other than 
enforcing the clear textual meaning of a statute in noncontroversial cases. Almost all statutes are 
ambiguous in some respects and interact with a dizzying array of other statutes within the legal 
system. If courts were simply left to police the outer boundaries of statutes where they are 
unquestionably clear, that would certainly seem to work a major transfer of power from the courts 
to agencies. And if some ambiguities are amenable to resolution by courts and others not, one needs 
an account of such a distinction. That is the account this Article seeks to provide—by distinguishing 
between genuine ambiguities on the one hand, and gaps or silences on the other hand that call for 
exercises of the specification rather than interpretation power. 
191 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 
67 (2011) (“Ambiguity refers to words that have more than one sense or meaning. Vagueness refers to 
the penumbra or borderline of a word’s meaning, where it may be unclear whether a certain object 
is included within it or not.”). 
192 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *60 (noting that as part of the interpretation of 
laws, judges first look to the usual signification of words, but if the “words happen to be still dubious, 
we may establish their meaning from the context,” and also from the “subject-matter” of the statute 
and the “effects and consequence” of the signification of the words). 
193 See supra subsection II.C.3. 
194 Bednar & Hickman, supra note 10, at 1398. 
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skeptics. The executive branch has long exercised discretion pursuant to its 
executive power to fill in statutory details where it was inconvenient for the 
legislative branch to act, either as an incident to enforcing the law or where 
Congress has explicitly delegated its nonexclusive legislative power to fill in 
such details. The skeptics can still call for an end to deference to executive 
interpretation, while recognizing that courts have a limited role in policing 
the outer boundaries of executive specification.195 
To be sure, lower-order disagreements will exist over whether an agency 
action falls within the permissible bounds of the statute and is thus a proper 
exercise of specification, or whether it is a misinterpretation of the statute 
because it falls outside the permissible. Even if different judges might come 
to different conclusions, however, the issue is not whether interpretation is 
an error-free or disagreement-free exercise. The question is who has the 
power to decide, even in the face of possible errors and disagreements. Article 
III assigns this task to life-tenured and salary-protected judges so that they 
are insulated from the political accountability that might otherwise justify 
Chevron deference. Yet these judges might use all their reasoning and legal 
resources and conclude that the statute simply does not require one answer 
or another, and therefore it is left to the executive to specify the details with 
its Article II powers. 
Put another way, in every case a judge should be able to distinguish 
between interpretation and specification. Judges may disagree, to be sure, on 
what falls within the range of the specification power in a given case because 
they might disagree on the best interpretation of the statute and thus disagree 
on the scope of the policymaking space left for the agency. 
2. Revisiting Chevron and Its Predecessors 
Rereading Chevron in light of the above analysis reveals that the Court in 
that seminal case also conflated interpretation and specification. Chevron 
involved the decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under 
the Reagan Administration to interpret “stationary source” in the Clean Air 
Act to refer to an entire plant rather than to any individual emitting source 
within that plant (this was called the “bubble” policy).196 The bubble policy 
permitted plants to fall below certain regulatory standards with respect to 
individual sources of emissions so long as there were offsetting reductions in 
emissions in other parts of the plant.197 The Act’s statutory definition 
plausibly could refer either to any individual installation within a plant, or to 
 
195 They would still review executive specification to ensure the agency’s choices are not 
arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018). 
196 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 859-62 (1984). 
197 Id. at 853-55. 
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the plant as a whole. The Act defined stationary source as “any building, 
structure, facility, or installation” which emits air pollution.198 
The Court deferred to the agency’s choice and offered numerous 
rationales. On the one hand the Court suggested that “[w]e have long 
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, 
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”199 The 
Court, in other words, assumed the agency’s exercise of power was one of law-
interpretation. “In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”200 
On the other hand, the Court also argued that “[t]he power of an 
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program 
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill 
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,” and “[i]f Congress has 
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation.”201 Later on, the Court appears to conflate these ideas in the same 
sentence, noting for example that “[w]hen a challenge to an agency 
construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on 
the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail” because 
“[i]n such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to 
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”202 Thus, the Court 
held that the EPA’s choice was “a permissible construction of the statute.”203 
Properly understood, the Court in Chevron was not concerned with 
interpretation. The statute seemed to call rather for specification. A judge can 
stare at the statute all she wants, and it still defines a stationary source as “any 
building, structure, facility, or installation” which emits air pollution. What is a 
judge to do when there is a facility with multiple structures and installations—that 
is, when more than one of these definitions might apply? The statute is not 
ambiguous as to which is a stationary source; the Act says that they all can be so 
considered. The meaning of the statute, in other words, is clear. The statute simply 
does not answer which of these definitions to adopt when more than one applies. 
No matter how much one stares at this statute, even with its structure and 
 
198 Id. at 859 (quoting Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 4(a), 111(a)(3), 
84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2018)). 
199 Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
202 Id. at 866 (emphasis added). 
203 Id. 
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purposes in mind, it does not appear to answer the question; it is a gap in the 
statute within which it is left to the agency to specify the details. 
Earlier deference cases similarly seem to have contemplated specification 
rather than interpretation. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,204 for 
example, which is often considered to be a predecessor to Chevron,205 the 
majority of the Court did not appear to defer to the executive’s interpretation 
of the National Labor Relations Act. Hearst argued that “[b]ecause Congress 
did not explicitly define the term [employee], . . . its meaning must be 
determined by reference to common-law standards.”206 This was crucial: 
courts historically had not only an interpretation power, but a common-law 
lawmaking function akin to specification. It is this function that the Court 
appeared willing to give to the administrative agencies, not final authority 
over interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation “are for the courts 
to resolve,” the Court noted, “especially when arising in the first instance in 
judicial proceedings.”207 But the reviewing court’s function is more “limited” 
where the question is instead “one of specific application of a broad statutory 
term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must 
determine it initially.”208 
In other words, broad terms call not for interpretation, but rather the 
specification of details.209 That is because broad statutory terms like 
“unreasonable” or “unfair” or “fair and equitable” obviously include a large 
number of possibilities. But in and of themselves, they rarely answer the 
question of which of the possibilities to choose. 
3. Objections, and a Note on Judicial Power 
Formalists might reject the present thesis on the ground that what it has 
described as specification was historically considered part of interpretation. 
Justice Thomas has argued that if deference is justified on the basis of 
legislative delegations from Congress, then that, too, violates the 
 
204 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
205 See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 8, at 918 & n.27; Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2011). 
206 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 120. 
207 Id. at 130-31. 
208 Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
209 To be sure, it can still be disputed whether the statute actually had more to say on the 
meaning of the term “employee.” Justice Roberts in a separate opinion argued that “[t]he question 
who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a question of the meaning of the 
Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question.” Id. at 136 (Roberts, J., concurring 
in the judgment). But this view seems to conflate the historical judicial powers of interpretation and 
common-law lawmaking, i.e. the judicial interpretation and specification powers, the latter of which 
is also appropriate for the executive branch. 
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Constitution for Article I reasons.210 But there is no doubt that whether the 
courts’ activities were called interpretation, this historical judicial power 
entailed significant power to fashion rules in the absence of law from 
Congress. That is, courts historically exercised an interstitial, common-law 
legislative power, which they still exercise to at least some degree to this 
day.211 That much of the legal realist critique formalists really ought to 
accept.212 And Congress can, of course, revise the federal common law by 
legislation, a power it does not have over judicial decisions.213 If Congress 
could have obviated the need for this interstitial lawmaking power by 
legislating in more detail—and if, as this Article has aimed to show, the 
executive has always had a power to specify the details of a legislative 
program—then there is nothing about the modern transference of this 
specification power from courts to agencies that is inconsistent with the 
original constitutional design. 
From the other side, the legal realists might still object that all acts of 
interpretation are really acts of policymaking. That view, however, is 
inconsistent with the Founders’ design and their understanding of the 
separation of powers. “However difficult it may be to determine with 
precision the exact boundaries of the Legislative and Executive powers,” 
James Madison once exhorted his colleagues in the House of 
Representatives,214 there are still genuine lines dividing legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers. Our entire constitutional system depends on 
there being such boundaries. 
 
210 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]f we give 
the ‘force of law’ to agency pronouncements on matters of private conduct as to which Congress did 
not actually have an intent, we permit a body other than Congress to perform a function that requires 
an exercise of the legislative power.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
211 See, e.g., Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (“In absence of an 
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according 
to their own standards.”); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (observing that when federal courts decide questions that “cannot be answered from 
federal statutes alone,” they may “resort to all of the source materials of the common law,” which 
“follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes”); Swift v. Tyson, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that the federal courts have the power, on “questions of a 
more general nature” such as “the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, 
and especially to questions of general commercial law,” to ascertain “what is the just rule furnished 
by the principles of commercial law to govern the case”). 
212 But see generally Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (arguing that it is 
plausible to have a legal system in which judges find law). 
213 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871) (holding that Congress may not 
“prescribe rules of decision” to particular cases, but can amend legislation to create “new 
circumstances” which the court will then apply its “ordinary rules” to). 
214 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238 (1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
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What this Article has proposed is that the Founders’ view can be accepted 
without completely rejecting what the legal realists had to offer. They were 
right that historically judges exercised a kind of interstitial lawmaking power, 
and that often Congress explicitly leaves such power to the exercise of the 
executive branch. It does not follow, however, that all acts of interpretation are 
inherently lawmaking. The Founders may not have had the final word on the 
separation of powers, but that hardly means there are no limits demarcating the 
boundaries between the separate powers they identified. 
Finally, as a historical matter, judges often looked to statutory purposes 
and policy considerations in arriving at their judgments of what a statute 
required.215 The distinction between interpretation and specification does not 
necessarily require a judge to abandon purpose in arriving at what the judge 
believes to be the best reading of a statute. It does require, however, the 
recognition that matters of policy often call for specification by the agency. 
At least that much is justified by the modern shift from common-law to 
administrative regulation.216 
B. Enforcing Nondelegation (As-Applied) 
As explained, specification is bounded by interpretation: courts must 
determine as a matter of interpretation the scope of the permissible, which is 
then subject to the specification power. There may be another limit, however, 
on an agency’s exercise of the specification power: the nondelegation 
doctrine. There may come a point at which the “specification” of a legislative 
detail transgresses the boundary between mere specification, which is a 
nonexclusive legislative power, and exclusively legislative power that 
Congress must exercise. 
In an earlier Article, I argued that the courts could make the 
nondelegation doctrine workable by refashioning it to be a more modest, as-
applied nondelegation doctrine.217 The idea was to treat each statutory 
ambiguity the same way Chevron does, as an implicit delegation of power 
 
215 Justice Scalia noted this: 
Surely one of the most frequent justifications courts give for choosing a particular 
construction is that the alternative interpretation would produce “absurd” results, or 
results less compatible with the reason or purpose of the statute. This, it seems to me, 
unquestionably involves judicial consideration and evaluation of competing policies, 
and for precisely the same purpose for which (in the context we are discussing here) 
agencies consider and evaluate them—to determine which one will best effectuate the 
statutory purpose. 
Scalia, supra note 33, at 515. 
216 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2591. 
217 Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 977 (2018). 
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from Congress to the agency to resolve that ambiguity. The as-applied 
nondelegation doctrine would then assess each implicit delegation of 
authority for potential nondelegation violations.218 Thus, the incoherence of 
the major questions cases would be resolved because the Court could honestly 
find ambiguity yet hold that the regulation, rather than the statute, violates 
the Constitution as an impermissible legislative act made pursuant to an 
impermissible implicit delegation of authority from Congress.219 
The distinction between interpretation and specification clarifies this 
framework, which can replace the Chevron framework altogether. When 
judges confront an ambiguous statute, they must do all the interpretation they 
can to resolve what the statute, according to their own judgments, requires. 
But after exercising this judgment, the judges might conclude that the statute 
simply does not answer the question at hand—it leaves, either explicitly or 
implicitly, a gap for the agency to fill. The as-applied nondelegation doctrine 
then polices this specification power for impermissible delegations. The 
executive can specify the details within the discretion granted by a statute, 
but it cannot exercise “exclusively legislative” power. Sometimes the gaps will 
be too big for the agency to fill. That may have been the case in Youngstown. 
And if that’s the case, courts need not strike down the statutory provision 
which, after all, usually creates gaps of various sizes. The courts can instead 
strike down only those regulations or executive actions (like Truman’s) that 
are too big, or too important, or that otherwise meet the requirements 
(whatever they happen to be) for “exclusively legislative power.” 
C. Interpretative Rules and Hard-Look Review 
Although a full exploration of the following implications must await another 
day, it is worth pointing out that two of administrative law’s most persistent 
puzzles may also be resolved by distinguishing specification and interpretation. 
First, under the APA, interpretative rules do not have to go through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, in contrast to “legislative” rules.220 The test 
for distinguishing the two kinds of rules is that a rule is legislative if without 
that rule there would be an inadequate legislative basis for an enforcement 
action.221 This creates a puzzle. Under the theory of Chevron, most legislative 
rules are themselves interpretations of statutes. Indeed, the Mead doctrine 
says that deference to agency interpretation is warranted precisely where the 
 
218 Id. at 977, 1006. 
219 Id. at 989-90. 
220 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 
F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
221 Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112. 
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agency has promulgated a legislative rule.222 More still, under the Chenery II 
doctrine, it is usually acceptable for an agency to proceed directly from a 
broad statutory standard to an adjudication instead of resorting to 
rulemaking223—suggesting that most of the time there is an adequate 
legislative basis to enforce broad statutory standards, and so most 
rulemakings are interpretative after all. In other words, under the current 
doctrine, it is impossible to tell the difference between interpretative rules 
and legislative rules because both are interpretations of some prior legal 
authority that already provides a sufficient basis for enforcement. 
The distinction between interpretation and specification may help resolve 
this puzzle. Insofar as a rule or agency statement is in fact merely an 
interpretation of a statute, then it would not have to go through notice-and-
comment rulemaking because it is an “interpretative” rule under the APA. But 
the lack of public participation in the process of arriving at that interpretation 
ought to be acceptable because the courts would review such interpretations de 
novo, without deference. But insofar as the rule is not merely an interpretation, 
but actually a specification—the making of policy in the interstices of the 
acknowledged bounds of the statute—public participation through the notice-
and-comment process is and ought to be required by the APA. Courts do not 
have much of a say here, but at least the public does. 
This relates to a second puzzle: what is the relationship between “hard 
look” or arbitrary-and-capricious review of agency policymaking and 
Chevron’s second step?224 If regulations are all interpretations of statutes, then 
courts should defer to reasonable choices made by an agency. But if that’s the 
case, then there is no more room for hard-look review of the agency’s policy 
choices—which by assumption are actually just constructions of the statute. 
Put another way, if hard look review requires agencies to base their decisions 
“on a consideration of the relevant factors,”225 and the relevant factors are 
found in the statute, then Step Two and hard-look are identical. Several 
 
222 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001). 
223 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
224 Hard-look review is sometimes also called State Farm review after Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), which is often 
taken as the origin of hard-look review. See Joshua Revesz, Voluntary Remands: A Critical Reassessment, 
70 ADMIN. L. REV. 361, 379 (2018) (referring to the Court’s approach in State Farm as “hard look 
review”); David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 530 (2011) (acknowledging 
that State Farm review is sometimes called hard-look review). But see Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 
F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (outlining the evolution of “hard look review”); Joshua 
McKarcher, Restoring Reason: Reformulating the Swerve Doctrine of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. 
State Farm, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1342, 1342, 1362-63 (2008) (noting that the State Farm opinion 
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supra note 13, at 1149 n.23 (“Judge Leventhal is . . . the acknowledged progenitor of ‘hard look 
review.’”). 
225 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
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scholars and courts have therefore concluded that Chevron’s second step is 
tantamount to hard-look review.226 
The distinction between interpretation and specification may resolve this 
puzzle as well. Insofar as an agency’s act is truly an interpretive one, there is 
no need for hard-look review because the courts in any event review such 
interpretations de novo, and the analysis never proceeds past what is currently 
called Chevron Step One. But if the agency action were one of several possible 
policy choices, each of which would have been permissible under the statute, 
then the courts still could police such acts of specification to ensure their 
reasonableness if that is what Congress intended courts to do by granting 
courts the power of arbitrary-and-capricious review.227 
V. CONCLUSION 
When agencies implement statutes, modern doctrine describes their 
activity as interpretation, raising the question of how much deference courts 
ought to give such executive interpretations of law. Many scholars have 
advocated great deference on the ground that interpretation of broad 
statutory terms entails policymaking discretion, a claim that formalists 
typically reject as violative of Article III. This Article has aimed to show that 
when agencies implement a statutory scheme, they exercise both a power of 
law-interpretation and of law-specification. This Article has further aimed to 
show that it is perfectly constitutional as a formalist matter for agencies to 
exercise this specification power, even if they cannot have final say over the 
interpretation of law. This suggests that calls to overturn the modern 
deference regime may be correct, but likely overblown—at least if what 
agencies are usually doing is not interpretation, but specification. 
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